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Abstract—We consider a cyber-physical system consisting of
two interacting networks, i.e., a cyber-network overlaying a
physical-network. It is envisioned that these systems are more
vulnerable to attacks since node failures in one network may
result in (due to the interdependence) failures in the other
network, causing a cascade of failures that would potentially
lead to the collapse of the entire infrastructure. The robustness
of interdependent systems against this sort of catastrophic failure
hinges heavily on the allocation of the (interconnecting) links that
connect nodes in one network to nodes in the other network.
In this paper, we characterize the optimum inter-link allocation
strategy against random attacks in the case where the topology of
each individual network is unknown. In particular, we analyze the
“regular” allocation strategy that allots exactly the same number
of bi-directional inter-network links to all nodes in the system.
We show, both analytically and experimentally, that this strategy
yields better performance (from a network resilience perspective)
compared to all possible strategies, including strategies using
random allocation, unidirectional inter-links, etc.
Keywords: Interdependent networks, Cascading failures,
Robustness, Resource allocation, Random graph theory.
I. INTRODUCTION
Today’s worldwide network infrastructure consists a web
of interacting cyber-networks (e.g., the Internet) and physical
systems (e.g., the power grid). There is a consensus that inte-
grated cyber-physical systems will emerge as the underpinning
technology for major industries in the 21st century [9]. The
smart grid is one archetypal example of such systems where
the power grid network and the communication network for its
operational control are coupled together and depend on each
other; i.e., they are interdependent. While interdependency
allows building systems that are larger, smarter and more
complex, it has been observed [17] that interdependent systems
tend to be more fragile against failures, natural hazards and
attacks. For example, in the event of an attack to an inter-
dependent system, the failures in one of the networks can
cause failures of the dependent nodes in the other network
and vice versa. This process may continue in a recursive
manner and hence lead to a cascade of failures causing a
catastrophic impact on the overall cyber-physical system. In
fact, the cascading effect of even a partial Internet blackout
could disrupt major national infrastructure networks involving
Internet services, power grids and financial markets [3]. Real-
world examples include the 2003 blackout in the northeastern
United States and southeastern Canada [17] and the electrical
blackout that affected much of Italy on 28 September 2003
[3].
A. Background and Related Work
Despite recent studies of cascading failures in complex
networks, the dynamics of such failures and the impact across
multiple networks are not well understood. There is thus
a need to develop a new network science for modeling
and quantifying cascading failures, and to develop network
management algorithms that improve network robustness and
ensure overall network reliability against cascading failures.
Most existing studies on failures in complex networks consider
only the single network case. A notable exception is the
very recent work of Buldyrev et al. [3] in which a “one-to-
one correspondence” model for studying the ramifications of
interdependence between two networks is set forth. This model
considers two networks of the same size, say network A and
network B, where each node in network A depends on one and
only one node in network B and vice versa. In other words,
each node in network A has one bi-directional inter-edge
connecting it to a unique node in network B. Furthermore,
it is assumed that a node in either network can function only
if it has support from the other network; i.e., it is connected
(via an inter-edge) to at least one functioning node from the
other network.
The robustness of the one-to-one correspondence model was
studied in [3] using a similar approach to that of the works
considering single networks [5], [7]. Specifically, it is assumed
that a random attack is launched upon network A, causing the
failure of a fraction 1−p of the nodes; this was modeled by a
random removal of a fraction 1−p of the nodes from network
A. Due to the interdependency, these initial failures lead to
node failures from network B, which in turn may cause further
failures from network A thereby triggering an avalanche of
cascading failures. To evaluate the robustness of the model, the
size of the functioning parts of both networks are computed
at each stage of the cascading failure until a steady state is
reached; i.e., until the cascade of failure ends. One of the
important findings of [3] was to show the existence of a critical
threshold on p, denoted by pc, above which a considerable
fraction of nodes in both networks remain functional at the
steady state; on the other hand, if p < pc, both networks go
into a complete fragmentation and the entire system collapses.
Also, it is observed in [3] that interdependent network systems
have a much larger pc compared to that of the individual
constituent networks; this is compatible with the observation
that interdependent networks are more vulnerable to failures
and attacks.
The original work of Buldyrev et al. [3] has received much
attention and spurred the study of interdependent networks in
many different directions; e.g., see [4], [6], [10], [14], [15],
[16]. One major vein of work, including [4], [14], [16], aims
to extend the findings of [3] to more realistic scenarios than
the one-to-one correspondence model. More specifically, in [4]
the authors consider a one-to-one correspondence model with
the difference that mutually dependent nodes are now assumed
to have the same number of neighbors in their own networks;
i.e., their intra-degrees are assumed to be the same. In [14] the
authors consider the case where only a fraction of the nodes in
network A depend on the nodes in network B, and vice versa.
In other words, some nodes in one network are assumed to be
autonomous, meaning that they do not depend on nodes of the
other network to function properly. Nevertheless, in [14] it was
still assumed that a node can have at most one supporting node
from the other network. More recently, Shao et al. [16] pointed
out the fact that, in a realistic scenario, a node in network A
may depend on more than one node in network B, and vice
versa. In this case, a node will function as long as at least
one of its supporting nodes is still functional. To address this
case, Shao et al. [16] proposed a model where the inter-edges
are unidirectional and each node supports (and is supported
by) a random number of nodes from the other network. In a
different line of work, Schneider et al. [15] adopted a design
point of view and explored ways to improve the robustness of
the one-to-one correspondence model by letting some nodes be
autonomous. More precisely, they assume that the topologies
of networks A and B are known and propose a method, based
on degree and centrality, for choosing the autonomous nodes
properly in order to maximize the system robustness.
B. Summary of Main Results
In this study, we stand in the intersection of the two
aforementioned lines of work. First, we consider a model
where inter-edges are allocated regularly in the sense that all
nodes have exactly the same number of bi-directional inter-
edges, assuming that no topological information is available.
This ensures a uniform support-dependency relationship where
each node supports (and is supported by) the same number of
nodes from the other network. We analyze this new model
in terms of its robustness against random attacks via charac-
terizing the steady state size of the functioning parts of each
network as well as the critical fraction pc. In this regard, our
work generalizes the studies on the one-to-one correspondence
model and the model studied by Shao et al. [16]. From a design
perspective, we show analytically that the proposed method of
regular inter-edge allocation improves the robustness of the
system over the random allocation strategy studied in [16].
Indeed, for a given expected value of inter-degree (the number
of nodes it supports plus the number of nodes it depends upon)
per node, we show that: i) it is better (in terms of robustness) to
use bi-directional inter-links than unidirectional links, and ii)
it is better (in terms of robustness) to deterministically allot
each node exactly the same number of bi-directional inter-
edges rather than allotting each node a random number of
inter-edges.
These results imply that if the topologies of network A
and network B are unknown, then the optimum inter-link
allocation strategy is to allot exactly the same number of
bi-directional inter-edges to all nodes. Even if the statistical
information regarding the networks is available; e.g., say it
is known that network A is an Erdo˝s-Re´nyi [2] network
and network B is a scale-free network [1], regular inter-
edge allocation is still the best strategy in the absence of
the detailed topological information; e.g., in the case where
it is not possible to estimate the nodes that are likely to be
more important in preserving the connectivity of the networks,
say nodes with high betweenness [8]. Intuitively, this makes
sense because without knowing which nodes play a key role
in preserving the connectivity of the networks, it is best to
treat all nodes “identically” and give them equal priority in
inter-edge allocation.
The theoretical results in this paper are also supported by
extensive computer simulations. Numerical results are given
for the case where both networks are Erdo˝s-Re´nyi (ER) and
the optimality of the regular allocation strategy is verified.
To get a more concrete sense, assume that A and B are ER
networks with N nodes and average degree 4. When inter-
edges are allocated regularly so that each node has exactly 2
bi-directional inter-edges, the critical threshold pc is equal to
0.43. However, for the same networks A and B, if the number
of inter-edges follows a Poisson distribution with mean 2, the
critical pc turns out to be equal to 0.82. This is a significant
difference in terms of robustness, since in the former case the
system is resilient to the random failure of up to 57% of the
nodes while in the latter case, the system is resilient to the
random failure of up to only 18% of the nodes.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first work
that characterizes the robustness of interdependent networks
under regular allocation of bi-directional inter-edges. Also, it is
the first work that determines analytically and experimentally
the optimum inter-edge allocation strategy in the absence of
topological information. We believe that our findings along
this line shed light on the design of interdependent systems.
C. Structure of the Paper
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we intro-
duce the system model and present an overview of cascading
failures. The behavior of this model under random attacks
is analyzed in Section III, where the functional size of the
networks is characterized. Section IV is devoted to proving the
optimality of regular inter-link allocation, while in Section V
we give numerical examples and simulation results. Possible
future research is explained and the paper is concluded in
Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a cyber-physical system consisting of two inter-
acting networks, say network A and network B. For simplicity,
both networks are assumed to have N nodes and the vertex
sets in their respective graphical representations are denoted
by {v1, . . . , vN} and {v′1, . . . , v′N}. We refer to the edges
connecting nodes within the same network as intra-edges and
those connecting nodes from two different networks as inter-
edges. Simply put, we assume that a node can function only if
it is connected (via an inter-edge) to at least one functioning
node in the other network [3]; and we will elaborate further
on this. Clearly, the interdependency between two networks is
intimately related to the inter-edges connecting them. In this
study, inter-edges are assumed to be bi-directional so that it
is convenient to use an N ×N interdependency matrix C to
represent the bi-directional inter-edges between networks A
and B. Specifically, for each n,m = 1, . . . , N , let
(C)nm =
{
1 if vn and v′m depend on each other
0 otherwise (1)
We also assume that inter-edges are allocated regularly so
that each node has exactly k inter-edges, where k is an integer
satisfying k ≤ N . Without loss of generality, this strategy
can be implemented in the following manner: For each n =
1, 2, . . . , N , let the interdependency matrix be given by
(C)nm =
{
1 if m = n, n⊕ 1, . . . , n⊕ (k − 1)
0 otherwise, (2)
where we define
n⊕ l =
{
n+ ℓ if n+ l ≤ N
n+ ℓ−N if n+ l > N,
for each ℓ = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1; see also Figure 1.
We are interested in evaluating the network robustness in the
case of random node failures (or equivalently random attacks).
Specifically, in the dynamics of cascading failures, we assume
that a node is functioning at Stage i if the following conditions
are satisfied [3], [16]: i) The node has at least one inter-edge
with a node that was functioning at Stage i− 1; ii) The node
belongs to the giant (i.e., the largest) component of the sub-
network formed by the nodes (of its own network) that satisfy
condition i). For both networks, a giant component consisting
of functioning nodes will be referred to as a functioning giant
component.
We assume that the cascade of failures is triggered by the
failure of a fraction 1−p of the nodes in network A. We further
assume that these (1 − p)N nodes are chosen (say by the
attacker) uniformly at random amongst all nodes in network
A. By the definitions given above, it can be seen that after the
initial attack, only nodes in the functioning giant component
of A can operate properly. As a result of that, in the next
stage, some of the nodes in network B may end up losing all
of their inter-connections and turn dysfunctional. In that case,
Network B
1
2 2
1
Network A
N
k
k−1
N
Fig. 1. A sketch of the proposed system model, namely the regular allocation
strategy of bi-directional inter-edges: Each node in A is connected to exactly k
nodes in B, and vice versa.
TABLE I
KEY NOTATION IN THE ANALYSIS OF CASCADING FAILURES
Ai, Bi the functioning giant components in A and B at stage i
pAi, pBi
the fractions corresponding to functioning giant components
at stage i, |Ai| = pAiN , |Bi| = pBiN
A¯i, B¯i
the remaining nodes in A and B retaining at least one
inter-edge at stage i.
the nodes that can function properly in network B will only
be those in the functioning giant component of B. But, this
fragmentation of network B may now trigger further failures
in network A due to nodes that lose all their B-connections.
Continuing in this manner, the cascade of failures propagates
alternately between A and B, eventually (i.e., in steady state)
leading to either: 1) residual functioning giant components
in both networks, or 2) complete failure of the entire system.
For an illustrative example, see Figure 2 where a cascading
failure is demonstrated for a pair of interdependent networks
with N = 6 nodes, k = 2, and p = 2/3.
III. ANALYSIS OF CASCADING FAILURES UNDER
REGULAR ALLOCATION OF INTER-EDGES
In this section, we analyze the dynamics of cascading
failures in two interacting networks. A principal objective
of this study is to quantify the effectiveness of the regular
allocation strategy for network robustness, by means of: i)
characterizing the size of the remaining giant components in
networks A and B after the cascade has reached a steady state,
and ii) finding the corresponding critical threshold pc. To these
ends, we will use the technique of generating functions [12],
[13] to analyze the sizes of functioning giant components in
the two networks at each stage. For convenience, the notation
used in the calculations is summarized in Table I.
Initial set-up
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Fig. 2. An illustration of cascading failures in two interdependent networks. Network A with nodes {v1, v2, . . . , v6} and network B with nodes {v′1, v′2, . . . , v′6}
are interdependent with each node having exactly two bi-directional inter-edges. Initially, a random attack causes the failure of nodes v1 and v2. In stage 1, v1
and v2 are removed from the system along with all the links (inter and intra) that are incident upon them. As a result, node v3 becomes disconnected from
the functioning giant component of network A, and thus fails. These failures then cause the nodes v′
2
and v′
3
to fail as they lose all their supports; i.e., all the
inter-edges that are incident upon them are removed. In stage 2, we see the effect of removing v′
2
and v′
3
from network B: nodes v′
1
and v′
6
fail as they become
disconnected from the functioning giant component. The failure of nodes v′
1
and v′
6
then leads to the failure of node v6 in stage 3, since v6 was being supported
solely by v′
1
and v′
6
. By removal of the node v6, the failures stop and the system reaches steady state.
A. Stage 1 : Random Failure of Nodes in Network A
Following the failures of a fraction 1 − p of randomly
selected nodes in network A, the remaining network A¯1 has
size pN ; since we eventually let N grow large, pN can be
approximated as an integer. As in [3], [12], [13], [16], we use
the technique of generating functions to quantify the fraction
of the functioning giant component A1 ⊂ A¯1. Specifically,
let the function PA(p) determine the fraction of the giant
component in a random subgraph that occupies a fraction p
of the nodes in network A (the exact calculation of PA(p)
will be elaborated later). It follows that the functioning giant
component has size
|A1| = pPA(p)N := pA1N. (3)
As shall become apparent soon, at the end of each stage it
is necessary to determine not only the size of the functioning
giant component, but also the specific inter-edge distribution
over the functioning nodes; i.e., the numbers of functioning
nodes having particular numbers of inter-edges. Indeed, this
is what makes the analysis of the regular allocation model
more complicated than the models considered in [3], [14],
[16]. Here, at the end of Stage 1, each node in A1 still has k
inter-edges from network B since network B has not changed
yet.
B. Stage 2 : Impact of Random Node Failures in Network A
on Network B
As the functioning part of network A fragments from A to
A1 (in Stage 1), some of the inter-edges that were supporting
B-nodes would be removed. Observe that the probability of
removal can be approximated by 1− |A1|/|A| = 1− pA1 for
each inter-edge. With this perspective, a B-node loses k−j of
its inter-edges with probability
(
k
j
)
pjA1(1−pA1)
k−j
. Moreover,
it stops functioning with probability (1− pA1)k due to losing
all k of its inter-edges. As a result, with B¯2 denoting the set
of nodes in B that retain at least one inter-edge, we have
|B¯2| =
(
1− (1− pA1)
k
)
N = p′B2N, (4)
where p′B2 = 1 − (1 − pA1)k. Also, the distribution of inter-
edges over the nodes in B¯2 is given by
|B¯2|j =
(
k
j
)
pjA1(1 − pA1)
k−jN, j = 1, 2 . . . , k, (5)
with |B¯2|j denoting the number of nodes in B¯2 that have j
inter-edges.
As in Stage 1, the size of the functioning giant component
B2 ⊂ B¯2 can be predicted by
|B2| = p
′
B2PB(p
′
B2)N = pB2N, (6)
where PB(·) is defined analogously to the definition of PA(·)
given in Section III-A. Obviously, each node in B¯2 can survive
as a functioning node in B2 with probability PB(p′B2). Thus,
for each j = 1, 2, . . . , k, the number of nodes in B2 that have
j inter-edges is given (in view of (5)) by
|B2|j = PB(p
′
B2)
(
k
j
)
pjA1(1− pA1)
k−jN. (7)
C. Stage 3 : Further A-Nodes Failures due to B-Node Failures
Due to the fragmentation of the functional part of network
B from B¯2 to B2 (not B to B2), some of the nodes in A1
may now lose all their inter-edges and stop functioning. To
compute the probability of this event, first observe that each
inter-edge from B¯2 to A1 will be removed with an approximate
probability of 1 − |B2|/|B¯2| = 1 − PB(p′B2). Hence the
probability that a node in A1 will lose all of its inter-edges is
given by (1− PB(p′B2))k . It also follows that the size of the
network A¯3 ⊂ A1 comprised of the nodes that did not lose all
their inter-connections is given via
|A¯3| = pA1
(
1− (1− PB(p
′
B2))
k
)
N. (8)
In other words, in passing from A1 to A¯3, a fraction 1 −
|A¯3|/|A1| = (1−PB(p
′
B2))
k of the nodes have failed. As pre-
viously, the next step is to compute the size of the functioning
giant component A3 ⊂ A¯3. However, this a challenging task
as noted in [3]. Instead, we view the joint effect of the node
failures in Stage 1 and Stage 3 as equivalent (in terms of the
size of the resulting functional giant component; i.e., |A3|) to
the effect of an initial random attack that targets an appropriate
fraction (to be determined later) of the nodes. Intuitively, the
node failures in A1 at Stage 3 (i.e., the removal of a fraction
(1 − PB(p
′
B2))
k of nodes from A1) have the same effect as
taking out the same portion from A¯1 [3]. In other words, it
is equivalent to the removal of a fraction p(1 − PB(p′B2))k
of the nodes from A. Recalling also that a fraction 1 − p of
the nodes in network A failed as a result of the initial attack
at Stage 1, we find that the fragmentation of A to A¯3 can as
well be modeled (with respect to the size of A3) by an initial
attack targeting a fraction
1− p+ p (1− PB(p
′
B2))
k
= 1− p
(
1− (1− PB(p
′
B2))
k
)
of the nodes. It is now a standard step to conclude that, with
p′A3 = p
(
1− (1− PB(p
′
B2))
k
)
, the size of the functioning
giant component A3 is given by
|A3| = p
′
A3PA(p
′
A3)N = pA3N. (9)
D. Stage 4 : Further Fragmentation of Network B
Due to the network fragmentation from A¯3 to A3 in Stage
3, each inter-edge supporting a B2-node will be disconnected
with probability that equals the proportion nodes in A¯3 that did
not survive to A3; i.e., 1− |A3|/|A¯3| = 1 − PA(p′A3)/PA(p)
by (8) and (9). Consequently, a node in B2 with j inter-edges
will stop functioning with probability (1− PA(p′A3)/PA(p))
j
.
Recalling also the inter-edge distribution (7), the fraction L of
node failures in B2 is given by
L
=
1
N
k∑
j=1
|B2|j
(
1−
PA(p
′
A3)
PA(p)
)j
= PB(p
′
B2)
k∑
j=1
(
k
j
)
pjA1(1− pA1)
k−j
(
1−
PA(p
′
A3)
PA(p)
)j
= PB(p
′
B2)
((
1− pA1
PA(p
′
A3)
PA(p)
)k
− (1− pA1)
k
)
= PB(p
′
B2)
(
(1− pPA(p
′
A3))
k
− (1− pA1)
k
)
.
Since |B¯4| = |B2| − LN , it follows that
|B¯4| = PB(p
′
B2)
(
1− (1− pPA(p
′
A3))
k
)
N. (10)
In order to compute the size of the functioning giant
component B4 ⊂ B¯4, we proceed as in Stage 3. Specifically,
we view the joint effect of node removals in Stage 2 and Stage
4 as equivalent to that of an initial random attack which targets
an appropriate fraction of the nodes. To determine this fraction,
first observe that the failures in Stage 3 have triggered further
node failures in B2 resulting a fraction
1− |B¯4|
/
|B2| = 1−
(
1− (1− pPA(p
′
A3))
k
)/
p′B2 (11)
of the nodes’ failure. Next, note that the effect of these failures
on |B4| is equivalent to that of taking out the same fraction of
nodes from B¯2 [3]. Moreover, it has the same effect as taking
out a fraction p′B2
{
1−
(
1− (1− pPA(p
′
A3))
k
)/
p′B2
}
of the
nodes in B. Now, recalling that a fraction 1−p′B2 of nodes in
B have failed in Stage 2, we conclude that the joint effect of
cascading failures in Stage 2 and Stage 4 (on |B4|) is identical
to that of an initial random attack which targets a fraction
1− p′B2 + p
′
B2
(
1−
1− (1− pPA(p
′
A3))
k
p′B2
)
= (1− pPA(p
′
A3))
k
of nodes. As previously, with p′B4 = 1− (1− pPA(p′A3))
k
we
conclude that the size of the functioning giant component B4
is given by |B4| = p′B4PB(p′B4)N = pB4N .
E. Cascading Dynamics of Node Failures
As mentioned earlier, the main goal of this section is to
characterize the size of the functional giant components in
steady state. Indeed, along the lines outlined above, one can
obtain the sizes of all functioning giant components A1 ⊃
A3 ⊃ . . . ⊃ A2m+1 and B2 ⊃ B4 ⊃ . . . ⊃ B2m for any
integer m. However, it is easy to observe the pattern in the
expressions obtained so far and conclude that with p′A1 = p
the size of all giant components are given by the recursive
relations
pAi = p
′
AiPA(p
′
Ai),
p′Ai = p
(
1−
(
1− PB(p
′
Bi−1)
)k)
,
i = 3, 5, 7 . . . (12)
and
pBi = p
′
BiPB(p
′
Bi),
p′Bi = 1−
(
1− pPA(p
′
Ai−1)
)k
,
i = 2, 4, 6, . . . . (13)
This recursive process stops at an “equilibrium point” where
we have p′B2m−2 = p′B2m and p′A2m−1 = p′A2m+1 so that
neither network A nor network B fragments further. Setting
x = p′A2m+1 and y = p′B2m, this yields the transcendental
equations
x = p
(
1− (1− PB(y))
k
)
y = 1− (1− pPA(x))
k
. (14)
The analysis carried out up to this point is valid for all
networks, irrespective of their intra-structures. In principle,
for specific intra-structures of networks A and B (which
determine the functions PA and PB , respectively), the system
(14) of equations can be solved for given p and k. The steady-
state fractions of nodes in the giant components can then
be computed by using the relations limi→∞ pAi := PA∞ =
xPA(x) and limi→∞ pBi := PB∞ = yPB(y). Indeed, in
Section V, we consider a special case where both networks
A and B are Erdo˝s-Re´nyi (ER) graphs [2] and give solutions
of the system (14) for several values of p and k.
IV. OPTIMALITY OF REGULAR ALLOCATION STRATEGY
In this section, we show analytically that the regular al-
location strategy always yields stronger robustness than other
strategies and thus it is optimal in the absence of intra-topology
information. In the following, we refer to the system that uses
the regular allocation strategy as System 1. Specifically, we
consider two networks A and B where each node is uniformly
supported by k bi-directional inter-edges. For convenience,
we denote the fractions in the recursive relations (12)-(13)
as p′Ai(p; k) and p′Bi(p; k), where 1− p is the initial fraction
of failed nodes in network A. Also, we let PA1
∞
(p; k) and
PB1
∞
(p; k) be the steady-state fractions of functional giant
components of the two networks, respectively. Finally, we use
pc1(k) to denote the critical threshold associated with System
1.
In what follows, we first investigate the dynamics of cas-
cading failures in the auxiliary System 2, where bi-directional
inter-edges are distributed randomly amongst nodes. The anal-
ysis is carried out under a generic inter-degree distribution so
that all possible (bi-directional) inter-link allocation strategies
are covered. By making use of the convexity property and
Jensen’s inequality, we show that for a fixed mean inter-degree,
System 2 achieves the highest robustness against random
attacks when its inter-degree distribution degenerates, i.e.;
when all nodes have exactly the same number of inter-edges
so that System 2 is equivalent to System 1. Therefore, we
conclude that regular allocation yields the strongest robust-
ness amongst all possible (bi-directional) inter-link allocation
strategies. Next, we show that systems with bi-directional
inter-edges can better combat the cascading failures compared
to the systems with unidirectional inter-edges [16]. Together,
these results prove the optimality of the inter-link allocation
strategy in System 1; i.e., regular allocation of bi-directional
inter-edges.
A. Analysis of Random Allocation Strategy
We now introduce the auxiliary System 2. Consider two
arbitrary networks A and B, each with N nodes, and a discrete
probability distribution F : N→ [0, 1], such that
F (j) = αj , j = 0, 1, . . . , (15)
with
∑
∞
j=0 αj = 1.
To allocate the interdependency links, we first parti-
tion each network randomly into subgraphs with sizes
α0N,α1N,α2N, . . ..
1 By doing so, we can obtain subgraphs
{SAα0 , SAα1 , SAα2 , . . .} and {SBα0 , SBα1 , SBα2 , . . .}, such
that
|SAαj | = |SBαj | = αjN, j = 0, 1, . . . .
Then, for each j = 0, 1, . . ., assume that each node in
the subgraphs SAαj and SBαj is assigned j bi-directional
inter-edges. This ensures that the inter-degree of each node
is a random variable drawn from the distribution F ; i.e., an
arbitrary node will have j inter-edges with probability αj , for
each j = 0, 1, . . .. It is worth noting that the inter-degrees of
the nodes are not mutually independent since the total number
of inter-edges is fixed at E =
∑
αjjN for both networks.
We have a few more words on the possible implementa-
tion of the above random allocation strategy. Observe that
1For N large enough, each of these subgraph sizes can be well approxi-
mated by an integer.
each bi-directional edge can be treated equivalently as two
unidirectional edges. In this way, there are a total of 2E
unidirectional inter-edges in the system, where E edges are
going outward from network A and the other E edges are
going outward from network B. We randomly match each
unidirectional edge going outward from A to a unique edge
going outward from B and combine them into a single bi-
directional edge. To this end, let the edges going outward
from A and B be separately labeled as e = {e1, . . . , eE}
and e′ = {e′1, . . . , e′E}, respectively. Next, use the Knuth
shuffle algorithm [11] to obtain random permutations e¯ =
{e¯1, . . . , e¯E} and e¯′ = {e¯′1, . . . , e¯′E} of the vectors e and
e
′
, respectively. Finally, for each i = 1, . . . , E, match the
unidirectional inter-edges e¯j and e¯′j to obtain E bi-directional
inter-edges.
We now analyze the dynamics of cascading failures in
System 2 using an iterative approach similar to that in Section
III. For brevity, we skip most of the details and give only an
outline of the arguments that lead to the sizes of functional
giant components. The main difference from the analysis of
Section III is that the fractions of nodes in A and B retaining
at least one inter-edge, i.e., the fractions A¯i and B¯i, need to
be calculated differently from (8) and (10) due to the random
inter-degree of each node.
Owing to the fragmentation from B¯i−1 to Bi−1, each inter-
edge supporting A could be disconnected with probability 1−
|Bi−1|/|B¯i−1|, triggering further failures in network A at step
i. With this insight, the aggregate effect of the failures in B
up to stage i can be treated equivalently (with respect to the
size of Ai) as removing each inter-edge supporting A with
probability 1−ui. According to Section III, ui can be derived
as follows:
ui =
(i−1)/2∏
ℓ=1
|B2ℓ|∣∣B¯2ℓ∣∣ = PB(p′Bi−1) i = 3, 5, 7..., (16)
Similarly, the aggregate effect of node failures in A before
step i can be viewed as equivalent to removing each inter-
edge supporting B with probability 1−vi (with respect to the
size of Bi) such that
vi =
|A1|
|A|
i/2−1∏
ℓ=1
|A2ℓ+1|∣∣A¯2ℓ+1∣∣ = pPA(p′Ai−1) i = 2, 4, 6.... (17)
In System 2, each node is supported by j inter-edges with
probability αj . In view of this, at step i, a node in network
A would retain at least one inter-edge with probability 1 −
∞∑
j=0
αj(1− ui)
j
. Recalling also that a fraction 1 − p of the
nodes had already failed before the onset of the cascading
failure, the equivalent remaining fraction of network A at stage
i is given by:
p′Ai = p(1−
∞∑
j=0
αj(1− ui)
j)
= p(1−
∞∑
j=0
αj(1− PB(p
′
Bi−1))
j).
Similarly, the equivalent remaining fraction of network B turns
out to be
p′Bi = 1−
∞∑
j=0
αj(1− vi)
j
= 1−
∞∑
j=0
αj(1− pPA(p
′
Ai−1))
j .
Hence, the fractional sizes of the giant components at each
stage are given (with p′A1 = p) by
pAi = p
′
AiPA(p
′
Ai),
p′Ai = p(1−
∞∑
j=0
αj(1− PB(p
′
Bi−1))
j), (18)
for i = 3, 5, 7 . . . , and by
pBi = p
′
BiPB(p
′
Bi),
p′Bi = 1−
∞∑
j=0
αj(1− pPA(p
′
Ai−1))
j , (19)
for i = 2, 4, 6, . . .. We next show that System 1 is always more
robust than System 2 against random attacks by comparing the
recursive relations (12)-(13) and (18)-(19).
B. Regular Allocation versus Random Allocation
We now compare Systems 1 and 2 in terms of their robust-
ness against random attacks. For convenience, we use a vector
α = (α0, α1, . . .) to characterize the inter-degree distribution
F , where F (j) = αj . Next, we denote the fractions in
the recursive relations (18)-(19) as pAi(p;α), p′Ai(p;α) and
pBi(p;α), p
′
Bi(p;α). Also, we let PA2∞(p;α) and PB2∞(p;α)
be the respective steady-state fractions of the functional giant
components in the two networks where 1 − p is the fraction
of initially failed nodes in network A. In other words, we set
limi→∞ pAi(p;α) := PA2
∞
(p;α) and limi→∞ pBi(p;α) :=
PB2
∞
(p;α). Finally, we denote the critical threshold associated
with System 2 by pc2(α).
Assume that network A (respectively network B) of Sys-
tems 1 and 2 have the same size N and the same intra-degree
distribution such that the functions PA (respectively PB) are
identical for both systems. The next result shows that if the two
systems are “matched” through their mean inter-degrees, i.e.,
if k =
∞∑
j=0
αjj, System 1 always yields stronger robustness
than System 2 against random node failures.
Theorem 4.1: Under the condition
k =
∞∑
j=0
αjj, (20)
we have
PA1
∞
(p; k) ≥ PA2
∞
(p;α),
PB1
∞
(p; k) ≥ PB2
∞
(p;α);
(21)
and furthermore
pc1(k) ≤ pc2(α). (22)
Proof: Since PA and PB are monotonically increasing func-
tions [13], a sufficient condition ensuring (21) will hold is
p′Ai(p; k) ≥ p
′
Ai(p;α), i = 3, 5, 7 . . . ,
p′Bi(p; k) ≥ p
′
Bi(p;α), i = 2, 4, 6 . . . ,
(23)
where p′Ai(p; k), p′Bi(p; k), and p′Ai(p;α), p′Bi(p;α) denote
the fractions in the recursive relations (12)-(13), and (18)-(19),
respectively. We establish (23) by induction. First observe that
p′A1(p; k) = p
′
A1(p;α) = p and the inequality (23) is satisfied
for i = 1. In view of (12)-(13) and (18)-(19), condition (23)
for i = 2 will be satisfied if
(1− pPA(p
′
A1(p; k))
k
≤
∞∑
j=0
αj (1− pPA(p
′
A1(p;α)))
j
,
or equivalently
(1− pPA(p))
k
≤
∞∑
j=0
αj (1− pPA(p))
j
. (24)
Under (20), the convexity of (1 − pPA(p))x implies (24) by
Jensen’s inequality. Hence, we get that p′B2(p; k) ≥ p′B2(p;α)
and the base step is completed.
Suppose that the condition (23) is satisfied for each i =
1, 2, . . . , 2m − 1, 2m. We need to show that (23) holds also
for i = 2m + 1 and i = 2m + 2. For i = 2m + 1, the first
inequality will be satisfied if it holds that
(1− PB(p
′
B2m(p; k)))
k
≤
∞∑
j=0
αj (1− PB(p
′
B2m(p;α)))
j
By the induction hypothesis, we have PB(p′B2m(p; k)) ≥
PB(p
′
B2m(p;α)) since p′B2m(p; k) ≥ p′B2m(p;α). As a result,
the above inequality is satisfied if
(1− u)
k
≤
∞∑
j=0
αj (1− u)
j (25)
with u = PB(p′B2m(p;α)). As before, under (20), (25) is
ensured by the convexity of (1 − u)x in view of Jensen’s
inequality. The condition p′A2m+1(p; k) ≥ p′A2m+1(p;α) is
now established.
Now let i = 2m+2. The desired condition p′B2m+2(p; k) ≥
p′B2m+2(p;α) will be established if(
1− pPA(p
′
A2m+1(p; k))
)k
≤
∞∑
j=0
αj
(
1− pPA(p
′
A2m+1(p;α))
)j
,
or equivalently
(1− v)
k
≤
∞∑
j=0
αj (1− v)
j
, (26)
where we set v = pPA(p′A2m+1(p;α)). The last step fol-
lows from the previously obtained fact that p′A2m+1(p; k) ≥
p′A2m+1(p;α). Once more, (26) follows by the convexity of
(1−v)x and Jensen’s inequality. This establishes the induction
step and the desired conclusion (21) is obtained.
We next prove the inequality pc1(k) ≤ pc2(α) by way of
contradiction. Assume towards a contradiction that pc2(α) <
pc1(k) and fix p such that pc2(α) < p < pc1(k). Then, let
a fraction 1 − p of the nodes randomly fail in network A of
both systems. Since p is less than pc1 , the node failures will
eventually lead to complete fragmentation of the two networks
in System 1; i.e., we get PA1
∞
(p; k) = PB1
∞
(p; k) = 0. On the
other hand, the fact that p is larger than the critical threshold
pc2 ensures PA2
∞
(p;α) > 0 and PB2
∞
(p;α) > 0 by definition.
This clearly contradicts (21) and therefore it is always the case
that pc1(k) ≤ pc2(α) under (20).
We have now established that the regular allocation of
bi-directional inter-edges always yields stronger robustness
than any possible random allocation strategy that uses bi-
directional links. In the following section, we show that using
bidirectional inter-edges leads to a smaller critical threshold
and better robustness than using unidirectional inter-edges.
C. Bi-directional Inter-Edges versus Unidirectional Inter-
Edges
We now compare the robustness of System 2 with that of
the model considered in [16], hereafter referred to as System
3. As mentioned earlier, the model considered in [16] is based
on the random allocation of unidirectional inter-edges and
can be described as follows. As with System 2, consider two
arbitrary networks A and B, each with N nodes, and a discrete
probability distribution F : N → [0, 1] such that (15) holds.
Assume that each node is associated with a random number of
supporting nodes from the other network, and that this random
number is distributed according to F . In other words, for each
j = 0, 1, . . ., a node has j inward inter-edges with probability
αj . The supporting node for each of these inward edges is
selected randomly amongst all nodes of the other network
ensuring that the number of outward inter-edges follows a
binomial distribution for all nodes.
System 3 was studied in [16] using similar methods to those
of Section III and Section IV-A. This time, after an initial
failure of a fraction 1 − p of the nodes in network A, the
recursive relations for the fractions of giant components at
each stage turns [16] out to be (with p′A1 = p)
pAi = p
′
AiPA(p
′
Ai),
p′Ai = p(1−
∞∑
j=0
αj(1− p
′
Bi−1PB(p
′
Bi−1))
j), (27)
for i = 3, 5, 7 . . . , and
pBi = p
′
BiPB(p
′
Bi),
p′Bi = 1−
∞∑
j=0
αj(1 − p
′
Ai−1PA(p
′
Ai−1))
j , (28)
for i = 2, 4, 6, . . ..
Next, we compare System 2 and System 3 using the
recursive relations (18)-(19) and (27)-(28). In doing so, we
use the same notation to define the fractions in the recursive
relations (18)-(19) as used in Section IV-B, while the fractions
in (27)-(28) will be denoted by p3Ai(p;α), p′3Ai(p;α) and
p3Bi(p;α), p
′3
Bi(p;α). We let PA3
∞
(p;α) and PB3
∞
(p;α) be
the steady-state fractions of functional giant components in
System 3 if a fraction 1−p of the nodes initially fail in network
A. In other words, we set limi→∞ p3Ai(p;α) := PA3∞(p;α)
and limi→∞ p3Bi(p;α) := PB3∞(p;α). Finally, we denote by
pc3(α) the critical threshold for System 3.
The next result shows that System 2 is always more robust
than System 3 against random node failures.
Theorem 4.2: We have that
PA2
∞
(p;α) ≥ PA3
∞
(p;α),
PB2
∞
(p;α) ≥ PB3
∞
(p;α),
(29)
and furthermore,
pc2(α) ≤ pc3(α). (30)
Proof: Since PA(x) and PB(x) are monotonically increasing
[13], a sufficient condition ensuring (29) is given by
p′Ai(p;α) ≥ p
′3
Ai(p;α), i = 1, 3, 5 . . . ,
p′Bi(p;α) ≥ p
′3
Bi(p;α), i = 2, 4, 6 . . . .
(31)
We establish (31) by induction. First, observe that for i = 1,
p′A1(p;α) = p
′3
A1(p;α) = p and condition (31) is satisfied.
Next, for i = 2, we see from (19) and (28) that the inequality
p′B2(p;α) ≥ p
′3
B2(p;α)
will hold if
∞∑
j=0
αj(1− pPA(p
′
A1(p;α)))
j (32)
≤
∞∑
j=0
αj(1− p
′3
A1(p;α)PA(p
′3
A1(p;α)))
j .
Since p′A1(p;α) = p′
3
A1(p;α) = p, it is immediate that (32)
is satisfied with equality and this completes the base step of
the induction.
Suppose now that condition (31) is satisfied for all i =
1, 2, . . . , 2m− 1, 2m. We will establish (31) for i = 2m+ 1
and i = 2m+ 2 as well. Comparing (18) and (27), it is easy
to check that for i = 2m+ 1, (31) will hold if
∞∑
j=0
αj(1− PB(p
′
B2m(p;α)))
j (33)
≤
∞∑
j=0
αj(1− p
′3
B2m(p;α)PB(p
′3
B2m(p;α)))
j .
By the induction hypothesis, (31) holds for i = 2m so that
PB(p
′3
B2m(p;α)) ≤ PB(p
′
B2m(p;α)). It is now immediate
that (33) holds, since we always have p′3B2m(p;α) ≤ 1. This
establishes (31) for i = 2m+ 1; i.e., that
p′
3
A2m+1(p;α) ≤ p
′
A2m+1(p;α). (34)
For i = 2m+ 2, we see from (19) and (28) that condition
(31) will be satisfied if
∞∑
j=0
αj(1 − pPA(p
′
A2m+1(p;α)))
j (35)
≤
∞∑
j=0
αj(1− p
′3
A2m+1(p;α)PA(p
′3
A2m+1(p;α)))
j .
In view of (34) and the fact that p′3A2m+1(p;α) ≤ p,
we immediately obtain (35) and the induction step is now
completed. This establishes condition (31) for all i = 1, 2, . . .,
and we get (29).
The fact that (29) implies (30) can be shown by contradic-
tion, as in the proof of Theorem 4.1.
Summarizing, it can be seen from Theorem 4.2 that using
bi-directional inter-edges (System 2) always yields stronger
system robustness compared to using unidirectional inter-
edges (System 3). This being valid under an arbitrary dis-
tribution α of inter-edges, we conclude that regular allocation
of bi-directional inter-edges leads to the strongest robustness
(amongst all possible strategies) against random attacks as we
recall Theorem 4.1.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS: THE ERDO˝S-RE´NYI NETWORKS
CASE
To get a more concrete sense of the above analysis results,
we next look at some special cases of network models. In
particular, we assume both networks are Erdo˝s-Re´nyi networks
[2], with mean intra-degrees a and b, respectively. For this
case, the functions PA(x) and PB(y) that determine the size
of the giant components can be obtained [13] from
PA(x) = 1− fA and PB(y) = 1− fB, (36)
where fA and fB are the unique solutions of
fA = exp{ax(fA−1)} and fB = exp{by(fB−1)}. (37)
In what follows, we derive numerical results for the steady-
state giant component sizes as well as critical pc values.
Specifically, we first study System 1 by exploiting the recursive
relations (12)-(13) using (36) and (37). Similarly, we derive
numerical results for System 2 by using the recursive relations
(18)-(19). For both cases, we use extensive simulations to
verify the validity of the results obtained theoretically.
A. Numerical Results for System 1
Reporting (36) into (14), we get
x = p(1− fkB) y = 1− (1− p(1− fA))
k
. (38)
It follows that the giant component fractions at steady state
are given by
PA∞ = p(1− f
k
B)(1− fA),
PB∞ =
(
1− (1− p(1− fA))
k
)
(1− fB).
(39)
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Fig. 3. Possible solutions of the system (41) are depicted for several different
p values when a = b = 3 and k = 2. In all figures, the x-axis represents fA
while the y-axis represents fB . The critical pc corresponds to the case where
there is only one non-trivial solution to the system, i.e., the case when the two
curves are tangential to each other.
Next, substituting (38) into (37) we obtain
fA = exp{ap(1− f
k
B)(fA − 1)},
fB = exp{b
(
1− (1− p(1− fA))
k
)
(fB − 1)}.
(40)
We note that the system of equations (40) always has a trivial
solution fA = fB = 1, in which case the functional giant com-
ponent has zero fraction for both networks. More interesting
cases arise for large values of p when there exist non-trivial
solutions to (40). In particular, we focus on determining the
critical threshold pc; i.e., the minimum p that yields a non-
trivial solution of the system. Exploring this further, we see
by elementary algebra that (40) is equivalent to
fB = k
√
1− log fA(fA−1)ap if 0 ≤ fA < 1; ∀fB if fA = 1
fA = 1−
1− k
√
1−
log fB
(fB−1)b
p if 0 ≤ fB < 1; ∀fA if fB = 1.(41)
In general, it may be difficult to derive an explicit expression
for pc. Instead, we can solve (41) graphically for a given set
of parameters a, b, k, p and infer the critical threshold pc using
numerical methods. For instance, Figure 3 shows the possible
solutions of the system for several different p values when
a = b = 3 and k = 2. In Figures 3(a-c), we have p < pc
and there is only the trivial solution fA = fB = 1 so that
both networks go into a complete fragmentation at steady
state. In Figure 3(d), we have p = pc and there exists one
non-trivial solution, since the two curves intersect tangentially
at one point. In Figures 3(e-f), we have p > pc and there
exist two non-trivial intersection points corresponding to two
sets of giant component sizes. In these cases, the solution
corresponding to the cascading failures should be the point
that yields the larger giant component size. In other words,
the solution corresponds to the intersection point that is closer
to the starting point of the iterative process (see (39)).
In the manner outlined above, we can find the critical
threshold pc for any fixed values of the parameters a, b and
k. As illustrated in Figure 3, we can further add the tangential
condition
dfA
dfB
×
dfB
dfA
= 1 (42)
to the equations (41) since the critical pc value corresponds to
the tangent point of the two curves given by (41). Thus, the
critical values fAc , fBc and pc can be computed (numerically)
for any given set of parameters through the following system
of equations:
fB =
k
√
1−
log fA
(fA − 1)ap
if 0 ≤ fA < 1; (43)
fA = 1−
1− k
√
1− log fB(fB−1)b
p
if 0 ≤ fB < 1; (44)
dfA
dfB
|
Eq.(44)
×
dfB
dfA
|
Eq.(43)
= 1. (45)
The analysis results are now corroborated by simulations.
In Figure 4(a), we show the variation of pc with respect to
k for different values of a = b, where the critical pc values
are obtained by solving the system (45) graphically. To verify
these findings, we pick a few sets of values a, b and k from
the curves in Figure 4(a) and run simulations with N = 5000
nodes to estimate the probability pinf of the existence of a
functional giant component in steady state. As expected [3],
in all curves we see a sharp increase in pinf as p approaches
a critical threshold pc. It is clear that the estimated pc values
from the sharp transitions in Figure 4(b) are in good agreement
with the analysis results given in Figure 4(a).
B. Numerical Results for System 2
As in System 1, the recursive process (18)-(19) of System
2 stops at an “equilibrium point” where we have p′B2m−2 =
p′B2m = x and p′A2m−1 = p′A2m+1 = y. This yields the
transcendental equations
x = p(1−
∞∑
j=0
αj(1− PB(y))
j),
y = 1−
∞∑
j=0
αj(1− pPA(x))
j .
(46)
The steady-state fraction of nodes in the giant components can
be computed by using the relations limi→∞ pAi := PA∞ =
xPA(x) and limi→∞ pBi := PB∞ = yPB(y).
In particular, we assume that the inter-degree distribution F
at each node is a Poisson distribution with mean k, and hence
αj = e
−k k
j
j!
, j = 0, 1, 2, ...,∞. (47)
Substituting (36) and (47) into (46), we get
x = p

1− ∞∑
j=0
kj
j!
e−kfB
j

 = p(1− e−k(1−fB)) , (48)
and
y = 1−
∞∑
j=0
kj
j!
e−k (1− p(1− fA))
j = 1− e−kp(1−fA). (49)
Next, putting (48) and (49) into (37), we find
fA = 1 +
1
pk ln
(
1 + ln fBb(1−fB)
)
, if 0 ≤ fB < 1;
fB = 1 +
1
k ln
(
1 + ln fAap(1−fA)
)
, if 0 ≤ fA < 1;
∀fA if fB = 1; ∀fB if fA = 1.
(50)
As in the case for System 1, the critical threshold pc for System
2 corresponds to the tangential point of the curves given by
(50), and can be obtained by solving (50) graphically.
We now check the validity of these analytical results via
simulations. In Figure 5(a), we show the variation of analyt-
ically obtained pc values with respect to average inter-degree
k for different values of a = b. To verify these results, we
pick a few sets of values a, b and k from the curves in
Figure 5(a) and run simulations with N = 5000 nodes to
estimate the probability pinf of the existence of a functional
giant component in steady state. As expected [3], in all curves
we see a sharp increase in pinf as p approaches a critical
threshold pc. It is also clear from Figure 5(b) that, for all
parameter sets, such sharp transition occurs when p is close
to the corresponding pc value given in Figure 5(a).
C. A Comparison of System Robustness
In Section IV-B and IV-C, we have analytically proved
that the regular allocation of bi-directional inter-edges leads
to the strongest robustness against random attacks. To get
a more concrete sense, we now numerically compare the
system robustness of these strategies in terms of their critical
thresholds pc. Specifically, we consider coupled Erdo˝s-Re´nyi
networks with mean intra-degrees a and b. For the sake of
fair comparison, we assume that the mean inter-degree is set
to k for all systems; in both Systems 2 and 3, the inter-degree
distribution F at each node is assumed to be Poisson. The
critical threshold value pc corresponding to all three strategies
are compared under a variety of conditions. For Systems 1
and 2, we use the numerical results derived in Section V-A
and Section V-B, respectively, while for System 3 we use the
numerical results provided in [16].
First, we compare System 1 with System 3 to see the
difference between the proposed regular inter-edge allocation
strategy and the strategy in [16]. Figure 6(a) depicts pc as a
function of mean inter-degree k for various values of a = b,
while Figure 6(b) depicts the variation of pc with respect to
a = b for different k values. In all cases, it is seen that regular
allocation of bi-directional inter-edges yields a much smaller
pc (and thus, a more robust system) than random allocation of
unidirectional inter-edges. For instance, for a = b = k = 4,
System 3 [16, Figure 2] gives pc = 0.43, whereas, as seen via
Figure 6(a), System 1 yields a critical threshold at 0.317. This
is a significant difference since it means that System 3 can
have a functioning giant component despite a random failure
of at most 57% of the nodes, whereas System 1, which uses the
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
k
p c
 
 
a=b=3
a=b=4
a=b=5
a=b=6
(a)
0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
p
p i
nf
 
 a,b=3 k=3
a,b=3 k=5
a,b=6 k=3
p
c
p
c
 
p
c
(b)
Fig. 4. a) The critical pc value versus k for the regular allocation strategy (System 1). The plots are obtained by solving the system (45) graphically for various
a, b values. It can be seen that as k increases the robustness of the system increases and the critical fraction pc approaches that of a single network; i.e., 1a [2]. b)
Experimental results for the regular allocation strategy (System 1) with N = 5000 nodes. A fraction 1 − p of the nodes are randomly removed (from network
A) and the corresponding empirical probability pinf for the existence of a functional giant component at steady state is plotted. As expected, in all cases there is
a sharp increase when p approaches a critical threshold pc; for (a = b = 3, k = 3), (a = b = 3, k = 5) and (a = b = 6, k = 3), the critical pc values are
roughly equal to 0.47, 0.41 and 0.23, respectively. Clearly, these pc values are in close agreement with the corresponding ones of Figure 4(a) which are obtained
analytically.
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Fig. 5. a) The critical pc value versus k for the random allocation strategy (System 2). The plots are obtained by solving the system (50) graphically for various
a, b values. It is seen that the critical pc can be larger than one in some cases (e.g., for a = b = 3 and k = 1) meaning that the system collapses already without
any node being attacked. This is because, due to the random allocation of inter-edges, a non-negligible fraction of the nodes receive no inter-edges and become
automatically non-functional even if they are not attacked. b) Experimental results for System 2 with N = 5000 nodes. A fraction 1−p of the nodes are randomly
removed (from network A) and the corresponding empirical probability pinf for the existence of a functional giant component at the steady state is plotted. As
expected, in all cases there is a sharp increase when p approaches to a critical threshold pc; for (a = b = 4, k = 2), (a = b = 4, k = 3) and (a = b = k = 4),
the critical pc values are roughly equal to 0.480, 0.380 and 0.335, respectively. Clearly, these pc values are in close agreement with the corresponding ones of
Figure 5(a) which are obtained analytically.
regular inter-edge allocation scheme proposed in this paper, is
resistant to a random failure of up to 68% of the nodes. Indeed,
in some cases, our strategy can outperform that in [16] even
with half the (mean) inter-degree per node. For instance, when
a = b = 4, our strategy yields pc = 0.414 with only k = 2 as
compared to pc = 0.43 of the System 3 with k = 4.
We also compare System 1 with System 2 in order to see
the improvement in allocating bi-directional edges regularly
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Fig. 6. A comparison of System 1, System 2 and System 3 in terms of their critical pc values when expected inter-degree of any node is set to k. For System 2
and System 3, the distribution of the number of inter-edges is assumed to be Poisson. In all figures, dashed lines correspond to System 3, dash-dot lines represent
System 2, and solid lines stand for System 1. a) pc v.s. k is depicted for different values of a = b in System 1 and System 3. b) pc v.s. a = b is depicted
for various k values in System 1 and System 3. In all cases, we see that the regular allocation of bi-directional inter-edges yields a smaller pc than the Poisson
distribution of unidirectional inter-edges with the same mean value k. c) pc v.s. k is depicted for different values of a = b in System 1 and System 2. It is clear
that System 1 yields a lower pc (and thus a higher robustness) than System 2 in all cases. d) pc v.s. a = b is depicted for various k values in System 1, System 2
and System 3. In all cases System 1 yields the lowest pc (i.e., highest robustness), while System 3 has the highest pc (i.e., lowest robustness) and System 2 stands
in between.
rather than randomly. Figure 6(c) depicts pc as a function of
mean inter-degree k for various values of a = b. It is seen
that, in all cases, System 1 yields a lower pc (and thus a more
robust system) than System 2. For example, when a = b = 3
and k = 2, we get pc = 0.56 for System 1, while for System
2, we find that pc = 0.68. The difference is significant in that
it corresponds to a resiliency against a random failure of up to
44% of the nodes in System 1 as compared to 32% in System
2.
Finally, in order to better illustrate the optimality of System
1 in terms of system robustness, we depict in Figure 6(d)
the variation of pc with respect to a = b for different values
of k in all three systems. It is clear that the proposed regular
allocation strategy in System 1 always yields the lowest pc and
thus provides the best resiliency against random attacks. We
also see that System 2 always outperforms System 3, showing
the superiority (in terms of robustness) of using bi-directional
inter-edges rather than unidirectional edges.
We believe that the drastic improvement in robustness
against random attacks seen in System 1 has its roots as
follows. First, in the absence of intra-topology information,
it is difficult to tell which nodes play more important roles
in preserving the connectivity of the networks. Thus, in order
to combat random attacks, it is reasonable to treat all nodes
equally and give them equal priority in inter-edge allocation.
Secondly, in Systems 2 and 3, there may exist a non-negligible
fraction of nodes with no inter-edge support from the other
network. Those nodes are automatically non-functional even
if they are not attacked. But, the regular allocation scheme
promises a guaranteed level of support, in terms of inter-
edges, for all nodes in both networks. Finally, using bi-
directional inter-edges ensures that the amount of support
provided is equal to the amount of support being received for
each node. Thus, the use of bi-directional inter-edges increases
the regularity of the support-dependency relationship relative
to unidirectional inter-edges, and this may help improve the
system robustness.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We study the robustness of a cyber-physical system in which
a cyber-network overlays a physical-network. To improve
network robustness against random node failures, we develop
and study a regular allocation strategy that allots a fixed
number of inter-network edges to each node. Our findings
reveal that the proposed regular allocation strategy yields the
optimal robustness amongst all strategies when no information
regarding the intra-topologies of the individual networks is
available. For future work, we conjecture that in the presence
of such information, the topology of the networks can be
exploited to further improve the robustness of cyber-physical
systems against cascading failures.
It is also of interest to study models that are more realistic
than the existing ones. For instance, in a realistic setting, one
can expect to see a certain correlation between the inter-edges
and the intra-edges of a system owing to the geographical
locations of the nodes. Also, some of the nodes may be
autonomous, meaning that they do not depend on nodes of
the other network to function properly; in that case, one can
expect the regular allocation strategy to still be the optimum
if the nodes that are autonomous are not known. Clearly,
there are still many open questions centered around network
interdependence in cyber-physical systems. We are currently
investigating related issues along this avenue.
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